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Abstract
A consideration of terrorism as communication necessarily draws attention to the development of counter 
narratives as a strategy for interrupting the process by which individuals become radicalised towards violent 
extremism. As the Internet has become a critical medium for psychological warfare by terrorists, some attempts 
have been made to challenge terroristic narratives through online social marketing and public information 
campaigns that offer alternative narratives to the terrorists’ online audiences. ‘Say No to Terror’ is one such 
campaign. This article reports on a study that examined the master narratives in the ‘Say No to Terror’ online 
campaign and applied concepts of ‘noise’ and persuasion in order to assess whether the key elements of the ‘Say 
No to Terror’ campaign align with the application of “noise” as a counter strategy against terrorists’ appeal on the 
Internet. The study found that while the master narratives of ‘Say No to Terror’ align with suggestions based on 
empirical research for the development of effective counter campaigns, the campaign does not meet the essential 
criteria for effective noise. 
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Introduction 
Terrorism has often been described as a form of communication by weak actors using violence as an 
instrument of last resort for communicating their cause. While psychologists argue violence communicates 
internal conflict in the perpetrator [1] some scholars of terrorism studies argue that terrorism cannot be 
viewed as a matter of individual psychology. Rather, the use of violence by terrorist actors is a strategic 
choice to communicate, through violence, that problems exist.[2] Terrorists use violence as a communication 
strategy to provoke effects that are not necessarily directly connected to the victim population. The 
effectiveness of violence lies not in the violence itself (the capacity for destruction) but in propaganda 
generated through the act and through the various communication protocols adopted by terrorist groups 
to influence and coerce target audiences. Among those communication protocols, terroristic narratives that 
use the Internet to reach large and disparate audiences have attracted considerable attention. The role of 
Internet disseminated propaganda in the process of radicalisation has been questioned in prominent cases 
where it has been established that terrorist or extremist actors have been, at least in part, influenced by their 
online activities. Despite recognition that the Internet plays a role in the radicalisation process, there is 
still little evidence available to assess the assumption of causality between exposure to terroristic narratives 
on the Internet and radicalisation to violent extremism. A study by the RAND Corporation tested five 
assumptions in the literature with regard to Internet radicalisation and found that empirical evidence existed 
to support the assumption that the Internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised and serves as 
a space for individuals to find support for their ideas among like-minded individuals. The study also found 
that assumptions that the Internet accelerates the process of radicalisation and promotes self-radicalisation 
without physical contact were not supported.[3] 
The body of work that examines terrorist activity online approaches the problem by examining both 
terroristic content (including the ways in which terrorist content appears online) and the ways in which the 
terroristic narrative appeals to certain groups of users. Though the first has been given far more consideration 
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in the literature, there is an emerging interest in understanding why and how terrorist narratives are so 
seductive to particular targets. Aly argues for an approach to understanding the appeal of Jihadi-Salafist 
terroristic narratives that recognises the role of the audience as active players in the process of message 
transfer, influence and indoctrination. She offers a model for understanding the appeal of the online narrative 
that takes into account how needs that are shaped by social roles are gratified by the attributes, content and 
the context of different media platforms.[4] 
Weimann and von Knop posit that the social situation of diaspora communities that may be socially 
alienated, disenfranchised and in search of social bonding, creates a condition of emotional need that is 
served by the terroristic narrative. They identify several stages of engagement with terroristic narratives 
online: the searching phase; the seduction phase; the captivation phase; the persuasion phase and the 
operation phase. Understanding the process of engagement and radicalization allows for an identification 
of phases where the user is still vulnerable to ideas or messages that challenge those embedded in the 
terroristic narrative. Such counter messages can act as “noise” that interferes with or disrupts the process of 
radicalization.[5]
How Noise Works
In communication theory, noise is that which distorts the signal on its way from transmitter to recipient. 
Noise interferes with the communication process as it keeps the message from being understood and 
prevents it from achieving its desired effect. The concept of noise was first introduced in communication 
theory in the 1940’s by Shannon and Weaver.[6] They were mostly concerned with mechanical noise, such 
as the distortion of a voice on the telephone or interference with a television signal producing “snow” on the 
TV screen. In the succeeding decades, other kinds of noise have been recognized as potentially important 
problems for communication:[7] 
• Physical Noise is any external or environmental stimulus that distracts us from receiving the intended 
message sent by a communicator.
• Semantic noise occurs because of the ambiguities inherent in all languages and other sign systems.
• Cultural noise occurs when the culture or subculture of the audience is so different from that of the 
sender that the message is understood in a way that the sender might not have anticipated.
• Psychological noise results from preconceived notions we bring to the communication process, such 
as racial stereotypes, reputations, biases, and assumptions. 
While the concept of noise was first perceived as relevant only to interference with the transmission of a 
message, it later became recognized as a crucial element in the communication process, potentially affecting 
each stage of the process. The concept of noise in communication theory and research has often been treated 
as a negative element, damaging the communication process. In fact, most empirical uses of the concept were 
directed at reducing or minimizing noises to improve the flow of communication. However, today noise is 
breaking away from the status of undesirable phenomenon bestowed upon it by traditional communications 
theory. No longer merely an undesirable element to be eradicated so as to retain the purity of the original 
signal, noise can be regarded as a more complex and even desired element. When it comes to the terrorist 
(or any other illegal, harming, and dangerous communication), one may question the instrumentality of 
creating noise that may reduce the communicator’s efficiency and success. Creating and using semantic, 
psychological, cultural, and physical noises may describe a rich variety of counter measures and organize 
35ISSN  2334-3745 October 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 5
them in a strategic framework. Thus, noise could become a key conceptual and theoretical foundation in the 
strategy of countering terrorism online.
Noise in Counterterrorism Communication
In their article “Applying the Notion of Noise to Countering Online-Terrorism”, Weimann and von Knop 
suggested applying various “noises” in counterterrorism campaigns.[8] Later, Weimann developed a strategic 
communication plan for the disruption of terrorist communication, based on the use of Mechanical/
Technological Noises and Psychological/Social Noises.[9] 
Applying Mechanical/Technological Noises refers to the technological disruption of the flow of 
communication. The mechanical/technological tactics include a rich variety of interventions from the 
damaging of websites and the defacing and redirecting of users to the spreading of viruses and worms, 
blocking access, hacking, and total destruction. These deviant measures can be adopted and used against 
online terror and to minimize their reach and impact. In the most severe cases, hacking the websites may 
be the most extreme measure, though not always the most efficient one in the long run. Such disruptive 
counter-attacks on terrorist online platforms are not new: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton revealed that the 
U.S. government has been hacking al-Qaeda websites in an effort to sabotage the terrorist group’s activities.
[10] Such attacks have had very limited effects since the terrorists easily manage to re-establish their online 
platforms and re-emerge in cyberspace. A more sophisticated “mechanical noise” is the optional use of Trojan 
Horses, viruses, and worms against terrorists. The common distinction among the three is that a Trojan horse 
is a program that does something malicious when run by an unsuspecting user; a worm is something that 
replicates; and a virus is a worm that replicates by attaching itself to other programs.
Applying Psychological/Social Noises involves various psychological and social operations and counter 
propaganda. Different terms relate to Psychological/Social Noise: Information Warfare, Information 
Operation (IO), and the current doctrine of Military Information Support Operations (MISO). In 2010 the 
US Army dropped the Vietnam-era name “psychological operations” for its branch in charge of trying to 
change minds behind enemy lines, acknowledging the term can sound ominous. The Defense Department 
picked a more neutral name “Military Information Support Operations,” or MISO. MISO are planned 
operations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. 
As a communication medium and vehicle of influence, the Internet is a powerful tool for psychological 
campaigns. In many ways, terrorists launch their online campaigns in the same way legitimate political 
campaigns use the Internet. Both attempt to attract users, to seduce them by engaging them in a sensory 
experience, trying to manipulate their needs, suggesting the fulfilment of a goal, and inspiring and guiding 
the users to make a choice by providing a higher-level motivation. Campaigning via the interactive Internet 
often provides social bonding and replicates feelings of personal contact. These elements, frequent also in 
terrorist websites, can be used in counter campaigns too. However, before such campaigns are launched, the 
agencies involved should know the psychographic profiles of those susceptible to recruitment, and secondly, 
the messages that most likely affect them. They also need to understand how these individuals are influenced: 
what channels are meaningful to them, whom they listen to, the effect of peer networks, and how to reach 
them most effectively. 
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Counter Narratives, Noise and Persuasion
The reasons why an individual becomes radicalized are not yet fully understood. The fact that an individual 
embraces the terrorists’ narrative does not necessarily mean he/she will join Jihad against the West and/
or actually engage in any terrorist activity. Yet progress in counterterrorism appears to be related to both 
establishing a credible narrative and damaging the terrorist narrative. The role of narratives is relatively 
new to the examination and analysis of terrorism. Studies that have been undertaken have contributed to 
understanding how terroristic narratives are used strategically by violent extremists to establish and influence 
target audiences. Based on this knowledge, other studies apply understandings of the terroristic narrative to 
the construction of counter narratives that challenge the messages embedded in terroristic texts. Casebeer 
and Russell, for example, suggest that the most effective way to counter terrorism is by developing a ‘better 
story’ to replace “their” narrative. For this purpose, in Britain, a special communication unit, the Research, 
Information and Communication Unit (RICU) was set up in Whitehall in 2007. Its task was specifically to 
“use messaging to disrupt the al-Qaeda narrative”.[11] In the US, a Presidential Task Force report also argues 
for “rewriting the narrative”.[12] 
The construction of a counter narrative to violent jihad should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to 
combat radicalization and recruitment into violent extremist groups. The counter narrative differs from a 
counter information campaign in that, more than simply maligning the enemy or challenging its message, it 
offers an alternative vision to which one opts in; a storyline that gives meaning to the actions it is requesting 
of the subscriber. This narrative, then, must discredit that of the jihadists—most importantly de-legitimizing 
the violence they promote—while at the same time making a compelling case for forms of non-violent 
activism and civic participation. In the United States much of the Internet-based campaigning that has 
appeared in opposition to the jihadi narrative has been negative, formulated by groups and organisations 
with an anti-Islamic agenda. The same can be said of the Australian context where anti-Islamic groups such 
as the Australian Defence League have established a web presence that is as problematic as those of the 
jihadists.
In her Op-Ed article on “Future Terrorists,” Jane Harman argued that “we need to employ the best tools we 
know of to counter radicalizing messages and to build bridges to the vulnerable. (...) Narratives can inspire 
people to do terrible things, or to push back against those extremist voices.”[13] To run such a strategy, a 
political Internet campaign against terrorism must use tactics which have proven to be successful and which 
can be applied to the counterterrorism arena. Finding such effective tactics was at the heart of discussions at 
the Riyadh Conference on the “Use of the Internet to Counter the Appeal of Extremist Violence.” Co-hosted 
by the United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and the Naif Arab University 
for Security Sciences in Riyadh in partnership with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 
(January 2011),[14] the conference brought together around 150 policy-makers, experts, and practitioners 
from the public sector, international organizations, industries, academia, and the media. The conference 
focused on identifying good practices in using the Internet to undermine the appeal of terrorism, expose 
its lack of legitimacy and its negative impact, and undermine the credibility of its messengers. Key themes 
included the importance of identifying the target audience, crafting effective messages, identifying credible 
messengers, and using appropriate media to reach vulnerable communities.
There is an important source for counter-terrorist narratives: learning from those who have decided to leave 
terrorist organizations. As suggested by Jacobson, in order to determine what kind of counter-narrative 
might be effective among those seemingly hardened individuals already in terrorist organizations or those 
well along the path to radicalization, it is useful to study people who have voluntarily walked away from these 
paths.[15] Determining the reasons for such a change in perspective could help crafting messages designed to 
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pull people away from terrorist organizations. 
Say No to Terror
Say No to Terror is a comprehensive communication campaign comprising a website, media and social media 
presence. The campaign uses a variety of mechanisms including short videos and posters for communicating 
a counter narrative to selected elements of the terroristic narrative. The website is entirely in Arabic and hosts 
information content (Mission Statement/ About Us) as well as videos, forums, posters and links to social 
media platforms (Facebook and Twitter). Users who register on the website can post comments about the 
videos as well as other material. 
Say No to Terror is specifically aimed at a Muslim Arabic audience; this is underscored by the campaign’s 
slogan “Terrorism. I am Muslim: I am against it” and its language of delivery. According to the website, 
“Terrorism is a criminal act targeting innocent people, and it deserves to be fought by all means and to have 
its claims and its devastating effects on our society disclosed.” 
The “About Us” section of the full website describes the website creators as believers in the justice of true 
Islam and defenders of the greatness of Islam. Their mission is to: 
“expose the claims of terrorist agitators and unveil their crimes, to encourage all those who have a 
conscience to reject their criminal acts and destructive ideas and to fight them in order to protect our 
society from their wrongs and their destructive impact on all levels.”
Attempts to identify the source of the website have not yielded any significant insights- a domain search 
reveals that the domain is shielded behind a Washington based anonymity protection service. The website 
is hosted in Montenegro in what may be an attempt by the creators to circumvent attitudes of mistrust of 
American-sponsored communication in the Arab world. However, a close analysis of the website content 
suggests that affiliations lie with or are at least sympathetic to Saudi Arabia. The campaign videos are also 
posted on YouTube and repeatedly aired as public service announcements on the Pan-Arab Middle East 
Broadcasting Center (MBC) and Al-Arabiya channels, both Saudi-owned. Posts that refer to specific religious 
tenets or situations (such as the Syrian conflict) are consistent with Saudi Arabia’s stated position on such 
matters. These posts give precedence to the Saudi Arabian monarchy, “The Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques”, as the legitimate authority in Islam and emphasise the monarchy’s efforts to counter terrorism. In 
order to provide context and information about the website, a comprehensive translation and analysis of the 
website content was undertaken. 
The methodology involved an initial translation of the website content and videos from Arabic to English. 
The translation was undertaken by one of the authors (Aly) and a bilingual research assistant. Aly’s 
translations of the videos applied to both the visual elements (characters, setting, use of symbols) and the 
textual elements (spoken and written). This was followed by a qualitative content analysis of the written 
and visual texts to explore the content, structure and function of the messages embedded in the texts. The 
analysis was constructed around a grounded theory model, based on the one first developed by Glasser and 
Strauss.[16] This model involved an initial reading of the data to code for as many categories as possible. 
These categories originated in concepts borrowed from content analysis of terroristic narratives available in 
the literature (for example: jihad, martyrs, caliphate) as well as the researcher’s own knowledge of the cultural 
and linguistic setting and the significance of particular concepts within this setting (for example: zakat, takfir, 
sectarianism). The initial open coding of the data [17] highlighted themes in the videos and posts for further 
analysis. The salient themes from the analysis of the videos and posters were then collated and integrated. 
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The final stage of the coding process produced four thematic categories or master narratives used in Say No 
to Terror to construct narratives about terrorism, its place in Arab society and its consequences. The master 
narratives, their attributes and the themes that comprise them are summarised in the following table:
Master narrative Descriptive content Themes
Terrorism is a dangerous threat Terrorism destroys individuals and 
families. Those who join terrorist 
groups are misled and the terrorist 
lifestyle is damaging. 
Jihad, Extremism, Sectarianism, 
Consequences of Terrorism. 
Terrorists are the enemy Terrorists are the real oppressors 
and attempt to brainwash children 
and youth. Muslims are suffering at 
the hands of terrorist criminals who 
kill other Muslims.
Takfir, Extremism, Manipulation 
and lies, “Enemies of Islam”.
Undermining terrorist leaders Terrorists are liars and manipulators 
who use Islam to serve a personal 
agenda.
Takfir, Extremism, Jihad, 
Manipulation and lies, Enemies of 
Islam.
Muslim obligation All Muslims have a duty to 
be vigilant against terrorist 
manipulators and to protect 
themselves and their families from 
the scourge of terrorism. Muslims 
have a duty to ensure that they 
are not inadvertently supporting 
terrorism. Those who support 
terrorism are also terrorists. 
Extremism, jihad, Consequences 
of terrorism, Vigilance against 
terrorism, Manipulation and lies.
While there would also be value in a quantitative analysis of aspects that may serve as indicators of the 
campaigns reach and/ or effectiveness, a quantitative analysis was considered beyond the scope of this 
particular study. Rather, the task undertaken in this case was to identify the master narratives of the texts 
and the persuasive elements embedded in these narratives: the purpose being to evaluate whether and how 
the master narrative of Say no to Terror forms a counter-narrative to the al-Qaeda master narrative. Finally, 
the master narrative and related messages of Say No to Terror were analysed through the framework of noise 
proposed by Weimann and Von Knopp . It describes five elements of a successful noise strategy: credibility; 
terminology; traditions; partners; and act local, think global. As the website is constantly updated, the 
analysis included all 15 videos available for viewing on the website at the time of writing and a selection of 
website content during the period February thru August 2013. 
Videos
The analysis of the 15 videos on the Say No to Terror website highlighted the following themes that appeal to 
either logic and reason (systematic persuasion) or habit and emotion (heuristic persuasion): 
1. Consequences of joining terrorism; 
2. Manipulation and lies;
3. The “enemies of Islam”; 
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4. Vigilance against terrorism. 
Importantly, these themes are constructed around familiar concepts in traditional Arab/ Muslim culture. The 
videos use Quranic verses and popular hadiths to accompany images and rely on Arab/ Muslim traditions 
that value family and the collective good over individualism. In this respect, the videos present a narrative 
that mirrors elements of the terroristic narrative that construct the call to armed jihad as an altruistic 
obligation for all Muslims for the sake of the greater good.[18] 
A salient theme in the website videos is that of exposing the agenda and manipulative techniques used by 
terrorist organisations. Several videos depict terrorist organisations as criminal and warn viewers against 
being manipulated by the terrorist narrative, while others use the testimony of former terrorists to expose 
“the enemies of Islam”. “The Misguided Terrorist” is presented as based on real events as a young man 
narrates an account of his arrest for terrorist activities. “The Enemy Within” picks up similar themes exposing 
terrorists for killing Muslims, while other videos such as “The Scream”, “I am Innocent of Your Crimes” and 
“No Life Flourishes where there is Terrorism” all draw on images of innocence juxtaposed against images 
of terrorism. These three videos use visuals of children and/or childhood symbols to draw attention to the 
injurious effects of terrorism. “The Road of no Return” is more explicitly focussed on sectarian violence, 
suggesting that the video is targeted at an Iraqi audience. The video exposes sectarianism as a vulnerability 
that extremists exploit: “Sectarianism makes you enter the prison of extremism, and so you become a prey for 
agitators seeking to achieve their political goals. It is not through sectarian extremism that you defend your 
religion, but you defend your religion through protecting it from sectarian extremism.”
Drawing on Arab/ Muslim social constructs of collective good, several videos urge viewers to be vigilant 
about terrorism and its influence. These include the video titled “An eye that watches is better than an eye 
that cries”, which warns viewers that “The Internet is a way to communicate and a gateway to knowledge. But 
the terrorists also see it as a window /path to our children, to brainwash their young minds and to convince 
them of their criminal principles. Our duty is to protect our children from danger and deception, not only in 
the schools and on the roads, but also within the sanctity of our homes. Terrorists are determined to mislead 
our children.” 
“The Clowns” also calls for vigilance but targets public support for terrorism by encouraging viewers to speak 
out against terrorism. Two videos titled “Zakat” and “Good Charity/ Bad Charity” attempt to raise public 
awareness of terrorist financing operations posing as valid charities. Both videos call on viewers to take 
personal responsibility for ensuring that charitable donations and zakat (Muslim obligatory charity) do not 
end up funding terrorist activities. 
Posts 
While the website videos tend to avoid reinterpretation of religious concepts that challenge the Jihadi- Salafi 
ideology, the posts and other website content take a more direct approach either through the images posted 
or by means of links to articles and opinion pieces that challenge the Jihadi- Salafi construction of key Islamic 
concepts. An analysis of the website posts during the period of examination reveals four themes:
1. Extremism (mainly in a context marked by sectarianism)
2. Takfir (accusing other Muslims of apostasy)
3. Jihad
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4. Terrorism 
For each of these themes, the website posts present an alternative construction and a world view that counters 
that found in terroristic master narratives. 
Sectarianism: The danger of sectarianism is regularly highlighted in the website with sectarian divisions a 
common theme. Sectarian strife such as in Iraq presents the ideal context for extremism to flourish and 
provides fertile ground for terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda to establish in a region /country.
Extremism: Extremism is described as the first step towards terrorism. Website posts aim to discredit 
extremists and their motives stating that extremists (specifically the Taliban and al-Qaeda) use jihad to justify 
killing innocent Muslims and non-Muslims. Specific posts denounce the hypocrisy of extremist Islamic 
scholars expressing cynicism of Sheikhs who issue fatwas about the obligation of jihad in Iraq and elsewhere 
and stating that their motives are financial gain among other things. A good example is the cartoon posted by 
the website administrators depicting a cleric telling his son “I will send you to the US to study and get a high-
ranking job “ and then telling another young man “I will send you for Jihad in Syria so that God willing you 
get into heaven” (posted 23 July 2013).
Other posts denounce the misleading discourse of incitement to violent jihad by preachers of extremism 
and the influence mechanisms they use. Islamic extremists are the enemies of Islam (they hold the image of 
Islam as hostage) and they feed Islamophobia. The reference to Islamophobia is particularly interesting and 
suggests an attempt to re-construct an understanding of Islamophobia that turns a lens onto extremism. 
An image posted on the website on 5 July 2013 shows terrorists holding Islam (represented by the image of a 
man dressed in traditional Arabic clothing) hostage. The cartoon bears the title Islamic extremists are the real 
enemies of Islam and is accompanied by the text “No one feeds Islamophobia with as much destruction and 
strength as do these Islamic extremists. They are the real Islamophobes.” The post links to an article published 
in the Opinion pages of Al Hayat news website that describes Islamophobia not as an attack on the teachings 
of Islam, but an attack on Muslims living in the West designed to limit their ability to actively engage with 
and contribute to the societies in which they live. As such, Islamophobia is most potently perpetrated by 
Islamist extremists who provide Western Islamophobes with justifications for their hostility towards Muslims.
[19] 
Takfir (accusing other Muslims of apostasy) is challenged through website posts, not through religious 
reconstruction or debate on the concept but by criticising its use to serve certain political agendas–namely 
those of Salafi groups. In the context of the Arab Spring, website posts makes some comment criticising 
authors supportive of political Islam movements who resort to takfir and who propagate al-Qaeda’s ideology. 
Terrorism and Jihad: A consistent message in the website posts is the denunciation of terrorism as a 
manipulation of religious doctrine. Terrorists are constructed (both visually and discursively) as menacing 
figures who kill innocents, kidnap civilians and send the Ummah’s youth to perdition. The poster titled Youth 
in the hands of preachers of extremism is accompanied by the text: “Who are these people who are misleading 
youth? They are a category of people who mix, in their methods and rhetoric, between old means of agitation 
and new ones. Sometimes they try to hide behind religious or ideological slogans and sometimes behind 
popular claims or appeals or slogans, in order to justify terrorism and call for more of it and incite young 
people to practise it. It has become clear that the misleading discourse of incitement uses a set of means and 
mechanisms” (Posted 29 April 2013).
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Master Narratives of ‘Say No to Terror’ and the al-Qaeda Master Narrative
Halverson et al introduced the concept of ‘master narratives’ that are employed by violent Islamist extremists 
in their ideological discourse. Unlike narratives, master narratives transcend localised differences, are deeply 
embedded in culture and, importantly, are constantly re-interpreted according to the historical context. 
According to Halverson et al, the violent extremist Islamist narrative commonly draws on sacred texts and 
Islamic history. One example is the Pharaoh master narrative which violent jihadists use to propagate their 
own struggles against regimes and to reinforce divine sovereignty. Similarly, the Battle of Badr, the first major 
battle between the Muslims and Quraysh, the most powerful tribe in Mecca, provides a powerful metaphor 
for contemporary conflicts reinterpreted as modern jihad. 
A report by the Open Source Centre identified the following elements of the al-Qaeda master narrative: 
•  War on Islam: There is a war going on against Islam, and the West is a major enemy.
• Agents of the West: Muslim rulers are agents of the West.
• The Nakba: The establishment of Israel is a humiliation and an injustice that Muslims must rectify.
• Violent Jihad: Muslims have a duty to wage violent jihad in order to achieve justice.
• Blood of the Martyrs: Self-sacrifice is the route to victory.
• Restoring the Caliphate: Ending injustice and suffering requires restoring Islamic rule according to al-
Qaeda’s version of Islamic law.[20]
Collectively, these six master narratives construct a salient argument that defines the problem, the solution 
and the required course of action. They employ both systemic and heuristic persuasion techniques appealing 
to emotion by constructing the problem as a gross humiliation and injustice to the Muslim world and to 
logic by drawing on historical evidence. Importantly, they also divert existing attitudes around issues such 
as the establishment of Israel into contemporary directions that call for action. This process known as 
“canalization”[21] which involves the channelling of existing motives, needs and values to new directions. 
According to Wallack, a communication campaign that calls for a change in behavior congruent with existing 
attitudes—or canalization—is more likely to succeed.[22] 
The al-Qaeda master narratives “ emphasize themes of shared humiliation, injustice, faithful duty, and the 
promise of re-establishing a golden age. Further, they draw on a robust set of historical evidence — from 
the earliest days of Islam to today’s hot zones — applicable to diverse audiences and geographies, giving 
al-Qaeda communicators the flexibility they need to use these master narratives across varied strategic and 
communications fronts. Historical depth and geographic breadth makes these stories enduring, dramatic, 
and highly resilient.”[23]
Collectively, the four master narratives of Say No to Terror form a coherent argument for resisting terrorism 
tailored to an Arabic audience. These narratives emphasise themes of familial and national loyalty and social 
well-being, drawing heavily on cultural dimensions of the Arabic collective society. 
As a counter marketing campaign, Say No to Terror employs mechanisms that communicate incentives and 
benefits for resisting terrorism that appeal to the cultural values of the target audience. These mechanisms are 
important for assessing how the campaign operates as a counter marketing strategy. Even more important 
is that master narratives in the campaign, like the violent Islamist narrative, are deeply embedded in Islamic 
cultural history and they challenges elements of the al-Qaeda master narrative by offering alternative 
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constructions and understandings of contemporary affairs. 
The master narratives of Say No to Terror comprise elements derived from sacred texts. Quranic verses that 
directly or indirectly challenge violent extremist interpretations of key Islamic doctrines such as jihad and 
takfir are used to expose and undermine the political agenda of violent extremists. In doing so, this narrative 
reconstructs terrorists—not the West—as the most threatening enemy of Islam and attempts to manipulate 
the intersubjective world view of Muslims that positions the West as a force that is actively engaging in an 
ongoing war to undermine Islam. While the master narratives of al-Qaeda impose on Muslims a religiously 
sanctioned moral obligation to wage violent jihad, the master narratives of Say No to Terror impose a 
religiously sanctioned moral obligation to protect themselves and their communities from extremism and 
terrorism. While the master narratives of al-Qaeda construct Muslim rulers as agents of the West and call 
for a restoration of justice through the imposition of Islamic rule, the master narratives of Say No to Terror 
emphasise the ordained authority of “The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”. 
In constructing a counter narrative that primarily aims at challenging the validity of terrorism, the 
justification of violent jihad and the authority of terrorist leaders Say No to Terror presents a counter 
campaign that aligns with Jacobsen’s suggestions for the construction of an effective counter narrative. 
Drawing on lessons learned from cases of former terrorists, Jacobson suggested several motives for counter-
narrative:
1. Undermine terrorist leadership: From the various terrorist dropout cases, it seems clear that a general 
lack of respect for a group’s leadership has often been a factor in dropping out of terrorist group or 
path. Thus, undermining terrorist and extremist leadership, should constitute one part of the tactic. 
Crafting messages that significantly detract from leaders’ authority and credibility is vital.
2. Highlight civilian/Muslim suffering, hypocrisy of the Islamist narrative: An effective counter-
narrative should also demonstrate civilian and Muslim victimization by extremism and terrorism. 
Disillusionment with the terrorists’ strategy and actions has been found to play a major reason people 
have left such groups. 
3. Portray terrorists as criminals: Many terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, are increasingly involved 
in a variety of criminal activities. These include a wide array of criminal activity, ranging from 
cigarette smuggling to selling counterfeit products, from identity thefts to production and selling of 
drugs. According to the [American] Drug Enforcement Administration, 19 of 43 U.S.-designated 
Foreign Terrorist organizations are definitively linked to the global drug trade, and up to 60 percent 
of terrorist organizations are suspected of having some ties with the illegal narcotics trade. Painting 
terrorists as common criminals may help demonstrate the impurity of their motives, ideology and 
supposed religious conviction.
4. Focus on life as a terrorist: The reality of life for a terrorist has often driven people out of them. 
Through studying the personal stories of terrorist dropouts, it can be discerned that the individual 
operatives’ perceived lack of respect from leaders was influential in their decision to break from the 
radical group. If people are joining because the terrorist lifestyle seems glamorous or because they 
believe they are fulfilling some larger purpose, demonstrating the reality will help to dispel these 
myths. This may involve the use of former members that can describe their unsatisfying lives as 
members of a terrorist organization, emphasizing that it simply does not live up to the hype.[24]
Jacobsen’s model for developing counter narratives also comes with an important caveat: “Another critical 
element of devising a successful counter-narrative strategy is recognising that governments are not always the 
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most effective messengers for presenting the counter-narrative… There are many cases, however, where other 
actors may make more effective and credible messengers.”[25] 
Say No to Terror as Noise
Analyses of the Say No to Terror master narratives or its persuasive elements do not necessarily yield any 
insights as to the effectiveness of the campaign as an online counter- terrorist narrative. An analysis of 
281 YouTube comments in response to the campaign videos by Al-Rawi found that 60% were negative, 
characterised by anger, mistrust and threats against the campaign sponsors. While this finding cannot be 
considered indicative of the overall response to the campaign given that those most likely to comment are 
those who feel either strongly negative or strongly positive, it does provide some indication as to the kinds 
of responses the campaign elicits. According to Al-Rawi’s analysis, the negative response to the videos is 
largely driven by suspicion about the authenticity and motives of the sponsors. Al Rawi also suggests that the 
campaign may have motivated a wave of counter efforts on YouTube. Inspired by the campaign’s catchphrase, 
videos entitled or tagged “Jihad, I’m Muslim: I’m with it” and “Occupation, I’m a Muslim; I’m against it” now 
vastly exceed the number of Say No to Terror videos on YouTube.[26]
Weimann and Von Knop argue that an effective communication strategy should combine both hard and soft 
power elements. In terms of noise, mechanical noise such as hacking incorporates elements of a hard power 
approach while social and psychological noise are characteristic of a soft approach. Weimann and von Knop 
suggest five elements of a successful noise strategy: credibility; terminology; traditions; partners; act local, 
think global.[27]
Credibility of the source is a decisive factor for ensuring the persuasiveness of any communication. 
Terroristic narratives derive their authority from the master narrative that draws on sacred texts. Religious 
authority in Islam is, however, flexible and contentious, allowing for counter narratives to similarly draw on 
sacred texts to establish credibility–particularly on the Internet. 
The fragmentation and decentralisation of religious authority in Islam has been noted by Eickleman and 
Piscatori. They argue that “the ulama no longer have, if they ever did, a monopoly on sacred authority. Rather, 
Sufi Shaykhs, engineers, professors of education, medical doctors, army and militia leaders, and others 
compete to speak for Islam.”[28] The Internet has both intensified and delegitimised traditional structures 
of religious authority creating a virtual marketplace of religious ideas and interpretations where epistemic 
authority in Islam is highly dependent on the perception and acceptance of authority by the social network.
[29] Weimann makes this point in relation to the issuing of jihadist fatwas [religious edicts] on the Internet: 
“The authors of jihadist fatwas come from diverse backgrounds. Some are scholars, some are religious 
authoritative figures, and others are political leaders of radical movements who are not seen in the wider 
Islamic world as having authority to provide fatwas, but are accepted as authorities by their followers.”[30] 
Several authors have observed that the Internet has challenged traditional structures of religious 
authority[31] by creating a competitive market where individuals can access religious texts, assemble their 
own religious guides and accept the religious authority of online experts. As such, the construction of 
religious authority is as central to the terroristic narrative as it is to any attempts to counter this narrative. 
In marketing, the practice of masking sponsors of a message in order to garner public support for a cause is 
referred to as astroturfing. Political astroturfing is often used to influence public opinion on issues that serve 
a particular political agenda by lending credibility to the source of the message.[32] Religious credibility 
in the Say No to Terror campaign should be established through the master narrative that draws on similar 
sacred text elements to the terroristic narrative but that also relies on damaging the credibility of the 
44ISSN  2334-3745 October 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 5
terroristic narrative. As Weimann and Von Knop propose, an effective counter strategy involves undermining 
the terrorists’ credibility while simultaneously introducing an alternative credible source.[33] 
Terminology plays a significant role in the effective application of noise. A consistent theme of Say No to 
Terror is the undermining of terrorists’ use of Islamic concepts like takfir. Interestingly, the campaign does 
not challenge the theological interpretations of key terminology, takfir and jihad, by replacing the terms with 
nonviolent interpretations. However, it criticises the use of the terms to serve the terrorists’ violent agenda 
and exposing their manipulative uses. Specific posts for example openly denounce the hypocrisy of scholars 
and express cynicism towards sheikhs who issue fatwas about the obligation of violent jihad, ascribing their 
motives to financial gain.
Traditions form the basis of the violent extremist Islamic master narrative. Thus, a key element of a viable 
counter narrative campaign should also draw on solutions from within Islamic cultural and religious 
traditions, symbols and values. Effectively, the strategy of utilising existing cultural traditions, attitudes and 
shared values constitutes canalization. Say No to Terror does not impose unfamiliar knowledge or social 
constructs. Instead it canalizes existing attitudes towards the West and socially embedded understandings of 
religious and moral obligations to new directions that motivate desired changes in behaviour–most notably 
those associated with identification of the enemy as violent extremists, renewed confidence in the traditional 
authority of the Saudi Arabian monarchy and increased vigilance such as taking responsibility for ensuring 
that charitable donations do not fund terrorist activities. 
Partners from within the target communities should be actively involved in online counter campaigns to 
ensure legitimacy and appeal to the target audiences. As mentioned, the source of Say No to Terror remains 
unidentified and anecdotal evidence suggests that there is some suspicion among Arab communities that 
the actual source and motive for the campaign originates in the United States. Though this suggestion 
requires validation, it is important to ensure that the legitimacy of the campaign is not undermined by such 
allegations and that, even if proven correct, the perceived affiliation with regional partners does not become 
perceived as an example of Western attempts to influence Arab affairs. 
Co-opting additional agents of change in ways that promote the concept of “act local, think global” is a 
necessary measure for long-term success. Supporting actors include education institutions, social welfare 
groups and non-government organisations. There is no evidence to suggest that Say No to Terror has 
transferred from the virtual to the real world through any form of local activism. However, should the 
campaign continue to expand, there are opportunities for schools and universities both within the Arab 
world and beyond to utilise Say No to Terror as an education resource and a platform for engaging discussion. 
Conclusion
The Say No to Terror website and web-based resources represent a novel attempt at disrupting online 
radicalisation by applying elements of social marketing to attitudinal and behavioural change objectives. 
From the perspective of noise, the campaign offers an opportunity to explore how noise strategies may be 
delivered through online counter narratives. A textual analysis of Say No to Terror offers some insights into 
how the elements that comprise a successful noise strategy may be applied in an online counter narrative 
campaign: credibility, terminology, traditions, partners; and act local, think global. 
The master narrative of Say No to Terror reconstructs several key concepts that are central to the al-Qaeda 
master narrative in ways that challenge and undermine the Jihadi-Salafist narrative but that are also deeply 
embedded in Islamic cultural tradition. Theoretically, the salient themes in Say No to Terror comprise what 
45ISSN  2334-3745 October 2014
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 8, Issue 5
should be an effective counter narrative: undermining the terrorist leadership (and reinforcing tradition 
Islamic leadership models); highlighting the hypocrisy of the Jihadi-Salafist narrative; portraying terrorists as 
criminals (and highlighting that support for terrorist activity, whether witting or unwitting, is also criminal); 
and focussing on the negative lifestyle of terrorists. However, the obscurity surrounding the origins and 
motives for Say No to Terror detracts from an essential element of successful noise–credibility. Credibility 
remains critical to ensuring the effectiveness of any communication, yet it is becoming increasingly 
challenging in the context of new media technologies that have had a transformative impact on how 
religious authority is established. One of the most significant challenges to an effective counter narrative is 
that traditional structures of religious authority in Islam are increasingly undermined and delegitimized by 
the Internet. Religious authority therefore becomes a matter of individual agency as individuals are able to 
assemble their own religious guides accepting those that conform to a certain world view and rejecting those 
that do not. 
Whether or not Say No to Terror is an effective communication strategy can only be determined through 
a long-term, measured assessment of the target audience responses (attitudinal and behavioural) to the 
campaign’s embedded narratives. A consideration of the audience, their everyday lives and the contexts 
within which users engage with Internet-based content, has often been lacking in analyses of terroristic 
narratives. It should be a primary consideration in the development of effective counter communication 
strategies.
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